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I 
STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 






Appearances: Nathaniel Mitchiner 96A3907 
Otisville Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 8 
Otisville, New York 10963 
Decision appealed: November 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. 
Board Member(s) Shapiro, Smith, Berliner 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Letter-briefreceived February 19, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~ _Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ _ _ _ 
_ ·_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_Vacated, 'remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Co iss1--~ f . 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination!!!.!!!! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ te . dings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 'JO ~'I 6b . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit- Appellant -Appellant's Counsel· Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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    Appellant challenges the November 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 24-month hold. Appellant’s instant offense involved him a co-defendant murdering the 
victim. Appellant raises the following claims: 1) the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh 
the required statutory factors, as all the Board did was to look only at the instant offense. 2) no 
aggravating factors exist. 3) the Board used wrong statutory language. 4) the decision lacks details. 
5) the decision lacks future guidance. 6) the decision lacks substantial evidence. 7) the Board 
illegally resentenced him. 8) the Board used the prohibited factor of community opposition. 9) the 
decision violated his due process constitutional liberty interest in early release.10)  the Board failed 
to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that no reason for departing from 
the COMPAS was given, and the statutes now focus on rehabilitation. 
 
     Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
 
     The Board may consider the brutality of the instant offense. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(a);  
Matter of Wiley v. State of New York Dept. of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 139 A.D.3d 1289, 32 
N.Y.S.3d 370 (3d Dept. 2016). Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 
996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 
N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Partee v. Evans, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 1259, 984 N.Y.S.2d 
894 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014); Matter of Marcus v. 
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Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 476, 476, 862 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Wellman v. 
Dennison, 23 A.D.3d 974, 975, 805 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Almeyda v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2d Dept. 2002); Matter of 
Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st 
Dept. 1997).     
 
     Credibility of an inmates explanation is to be made by the Board. The Board may consider  the 
inmate’s capacity to tell the truth, and how this impacts on the statutory factors. Siao-Pao v 
Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1st Dept. 2008). 
     “[T]here is a strong rehabilitative component in the statute that may be given effect by 
considering  insight.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000);  
Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 
2016) (lack of insight and failure to accept responsibility), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017); 
Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dept. 2007) (limited 
insight); Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 
(2d Dept. 2002) (limited insight into why crime committed).   
 
   The Board may consider an inmate’s need to complete rehabilitative programming in denying 
parole.  See Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. 
denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 
661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997); see also Matter of Connelly v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
286 A.D.2d 792, 729 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (3d Dept.), appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 677, 738 
N.Y.S.2d 291 (2001). 
    The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any 
aggravating factors.  Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). 
     That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) 
in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 
2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d 
Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 
796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release 
as “contrary to the best interest of the community”).   
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     The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
     As for Appellant’s complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state 
what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future.  Matter of Francis v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of 
Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 
1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).   
     Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
     An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
    That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest 
in parole release.  Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); 
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Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 
(3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). 
         Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence 
on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975). 
    The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and 
which is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007); MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
     There are no substantial evidence issues in a Parole Board Release Interview. Valderrama v 
Travis, 19 A.D.3d 904, 905, 796 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dept. 2005); Tatta v Dennison, 26 A.D.3d 663, 
809 N.Y.S.2d 296 (3d Dept. 2006)  lv.den. 6 N.Y.3d 714, 816 N.Y.S.2d 750; Harris v New York 
State Division of Parole, 211 A.D.2d 205, 628 N.Y.S.2d 416 (3d Dept. 1995).   A substantial 
evidence issue arises only where a quasi-judicial hearing has been held and evidence has been taken 
pursuant to law. If no hearing was held, the issue does not arise. Horace v Annucci, 133 A.D.3d 
1263, 20 N.Y.S.3d 492 (4th Dept. 2015). A proceeding to determine whether an inmate should be 
released on parole is not a quasi-judicial hearing. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 
515 (2d Dept. 2018). 
     The Board decision made no reference to community opposition, thus rendering this issue as 
being moot. Courts are generally prohibited from issuing advisory opinions or rulings on 
hypothetical inquiries. An appeal is moot unless an adjudication on the merits will result in 
immediate and practical consequences to the parties. Especially if other inmates are raising the issues 
as well. Colon v Annucci, 151 A.D.3d 1061, 57 N.Y.S.3d 512 (2d Dept. 2017); Kirkland v Annucci, 
150 A.D.3d 736, 54 N.Y.S.3d 40 (2d Dept. 2017); Aguilera v Annucci, 167 A.D.3d 1000, 88 
N.Y.S.3d 902 (2nd Dept. 2018).  In any event, the Board may receive and consider written 
communications from individuals, other than those specifically identified in Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A), opposing an inmate’s release to parole supervision.  Matter of Applewhite v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 1380, --N.Y.S.3d-- (3d Dept. 2018) (“Contrary to petitioner’s 
contention, we do not find that [the Board’s] consideration of certain unspecified ‘consistent 
community opposition’ to his parole release was outside the scope of the relevant statutory factors 
that may be taken into account in rendering a parole release determination”); Matter of Clark v. 
New York Bd. of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531, 89 N.Y.S.3d 134 (1st Dept. 2018) (“the Board 
permissibly considered letters in opposition to the parole application submitted by public officials 
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and members of the community”); Matter of Grigger v. New York State Div. of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 
850, 852–53, 783 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (3d Dept. 2004) (recognizing 259-i(2)(c)(A)(v)’s list is not 
the exclusive information the Board may consider and persons in addition to victims and their 
families may submit letters), lv. denied, 4 N.Y.3d 704, 792 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2005); see also Matter of 
Jordan v. Hammock, 86 A.D.2d 725, 447 N.Y.S.2d 44 (3d Dept. 1982) (letters from private citizens 
are protected and remain confidential). 
    In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
       Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive 
Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d 
Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 
133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law 
amendments have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017. 
     The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do 
not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. 
Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. The 
2017 amended regulations don’t create any substantive right to release, but rather, merely increase 
transparency in the final decision. Courts must defer to the Parole Board’s interpretation of its own 
regulations so long as it is rational and not arbitrary nor capricious. Brown v Stanford, 163 A.D.3d 
1337, 82 N.Y.S.3d 622 (3d Dept. 2018). 
     Appellant’s contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 Amendments to the 
Executive Law is likewise without merit.  Although Appellant alleges the amendments represented 
a fundamental change in the legal regime governing parole determinations requiring a focus on 
forward-looking factors, this proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, 
considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive 
change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process.  The 
Board still must conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, 
including the instant offense.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 
A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014).  Thus, even where the First Department 
has “take[n] the unusual step of affirming the annulment of a decision of [the Board]”, it has 
nonetheless reiterated that “[t]he Board is not obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every 
factor equal weight” and rejected any requirement that the Board prioritize “factors which 
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emphasize forward thinking and planning over the other statutory factors”.  Matter of Rossakis v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016).   
 
    The 2011 amendments still permit the Board to place greater emphasis on the gravity of the crime.  
Matter of Montane v Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866  (3d Dept.) appeal dismissed 24 
N.Y.3d 1052, 999 N.Y.S.2d 360 (2014); Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 
1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014); Moore v New York State Board of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 
1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412 (3d Dept. 2016). The Board can still consider the nature of the inmate’s 
crimes, the  criminal history, the  prison disciplinary record, the  program accomplishments and post 
release plans. Rivera v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014). The Board is obligated to consider the serious nature of the crime. Khatib v New York 
State Board of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014). 
     The Board did depart from the COMPAS, and gave reasons for so doing. Specifically, the Board 
held the appellant is likely to reoffend, and cited his poor attitude, and lack of insight, to justify the 
departure.  The Board is not required to use the actual  word “departure” in the decision.  
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
